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When Carlos Calvo, the famous Argentine jurist, stated that m
disputes between an alien and a government, the former has to resort
to local remedies waiving diplomatic protection from his own govern-
ment, he did not even suspect that he was originating one of the most
controversial clauses in the Law of Nations. Publicists today have con-
centrated their efforts on attacking this clause rather than on ascer-
taining its true purpose and juridical significance.' Hence, it must be
gaid from the beginning that the purpose of this article is to make an
attempt to place the Calvo Clause in its original context, for despite the
brilliant criticism of its enemies, it is still very much misunderstood
by the governments and internationalists with which it comes in contact.
I. Nature of the Calvo Clause.
The origins of the Calvo Clause may be traced back to the 19th
century when European governments practiced aggression and con-
quest on the basis of the inability of weak countries to meet their
financial obligations. 2 At this time, Calvo wrote in the Spanish edition
* Department of Political Science, University of Detroit. LL.B., University of
Panama, 1943, LL.M., Harvard, 1944, A.M., 1946, J.S.D., Yale, 1948.
1 The Calvo Clause is treated in the most varied forms in the following books:
G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (hereinafter Digest) (Wash-
ington. Government Printing Office, 1934), Vol. V, pp. 635-654, Edwin M.
Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New York: The Banks
Law Publishing Co., 1915), pp. 795-809; M. M. McMahon, Conquest and
Modern International Law, (Washington. The Catholic Umversity of America
Press, 1940), pp. 193-197, Clyde Eagleton, Responsibility of States in Inter-
national Law (New York: New York University Press, 1928), sec. 49; Linden
A. Mander, Foundations of Modern World Society, (Stanford. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1947), pp. 562-569; C. G. Fenwick, International Law, 3rd edi-
tion, (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1948), pp. 285-294, J. L. Brierly,
The Law of Nations, 2d edition, (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1938),
pp. 181-183, Oppenhem's International Law, Lauterpachts edition, (London.
Longmans, Green and Co., 1944), p. 312, H. W Briggs, The Law of Nations:
Cases, Documents and Notes, (New York: S. Crofts and Co., 1938), pp. 522-
523, P C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, (New York: The MacMillan
Co., 1948), pp. 110-112.
2 A discussion of non-payment of debts as a pretext for conquest may be found
in M. M. McMahon, Op.Cit. p. 93ff.
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of his book that in the event of a State's insolvency, aliens were not en-
titled to a higher degree of protection than domestic creditors and there-
fore, foreign citizens had to submit their claims to local courts.3 Later,
in the French edition of his treatise, Calvo elaborated his doctrine to
the point where it became a more logical one. It is largely based on
the following propositions 1) that equality, sovereignty and indepen-
dence are paramount rights of the States, 2) that States, being equal,
sovereign and independent, have the right to expect non-interference
from other States, and finally, 3) that aliens have to abide by the local
law of the State wherein they reside without invoking diplomatic pro-
tection of their governments in the prosecution of claims arising out of
contracts, insurrection, civil war or mob violence.4
This is the so-called Calvo Doctrine, which has given rise to the
Calvo Clause. Some international lawyers make a sharp distinction be-
tween these two institutions,5 overlooking completely the fact that the
Calvo Clause is a corollary of the Calvo Doctrine.
Historically, the Calvo Doctrine was directed to the Latin American
countries, especially to Mexico where Napoleon III had sent an expedi-
tion in 1861 to make effective certain claims of French citizens against
the Mexican government.' Out of the Calvo Doctrine the Latin Amer-
ican countries developed the Calvo Clause, which is incorporated in
contracts entered into between Central and South American govern-
ments on the one hand, and aliens on the other. These contracts spe-
cifically provide that the aliens shall resort to local remedies or the
settlement of disputes arising under the contract, and shall further
waive the diplomatic intervention of his own government. Since 1886
many Latin American States have incorporated into their constitutions
and laws the provision that every contract between an alien and a
government must, of necessity, contain a Calvo Clause.7 From a com-
prehensive study of present Latin American Constitutions I have been
able to determine four variations of the Calvo Clause.'
In the first place, there are the provisions that exclude diplomatic
protection under any circumstances. An example of such may be found
3 Carlos Calvo, Derecho Internactonal Teortco y Practco, (Buenos Aires, 1868).
4 Carlos Calvo, Le Droit Internattonal Theorique et Pratique, 5th edition, (Paris,
1896), Vol, sec. 256, pp. 231-232.
5 C. G. Fenwick, Op.Cit. p. 285, n. 42.
6 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, (New York:
The MacMillan Co., 1947), pp. 211-212.
7H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 522-523.
8 The English texts of the constitutional provisions that will follow are taken
from The Constitutions of the Amertcas, edited by Russell Fitzgibbon and
others, (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1948).
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in the present Mexican Constitution, which in dealing with the capacity
to acquire ownership of lands and waters of the Nation, provides that:
"Only Mexicans by birth or by naturalization or Mexican com-
panies have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and
their appurtenances or to obtain concessions for the exploitation
of mines, waters or combustible minerals in the Mexican Repub-
lic. The State may concede the same right to aliens provided
they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider
themselves as nationals with respect to said properties and not to
invoke the protection of their Governments in reference to same,
should they fail to respect the agreement, they shall be penalized
by losing to the benefit of the Nation the properties they may
have acquired." 9
Secondly, other constitutions give the right of diplomatic protection
only in cases of denial of justice. In this category belongs the Constitu-
tion of Bolivia, which states that:
"Foreign subjects and enterprises are, in respect to property, in
the same position as Bolivians, and can in no case plead an ex-
ceptional situation or appeal through diplomatic channels unless
in case of a denial of justice."10
Thirdly, the provisions that qualify the meaning of denial of justice,
such as the Constitution of Nicaragua, which says that:
"Aliens may not use diplomatic intervention except in cases of
denial of justice. The latter will not be so understood in the case
of an executory verdict unfavorable to the claimant. Those who
violate this provision will lose the right to reside in the
country."'1
And finally, the constitutional provisions which do not contain a
Calvo Clause, but rather incorporate the Calvo Doctrine providing that
the alien for all purposes is subject to treatment and obligations equal
with nationals. This type is found in the Constitution of Cuba, which
provides that:
"Aliens residing in the territory of the Republic shall be con-
sidered as equal to Cubans
1st. With regard to the protection of their persons and their
goods.
2nd. With regard to the enjoyment of rights recognized in this
Constitution, with the exception of those granted exclusively to
nationals.
9 Art. 27, paragraph 1st. Also the Constitutions of Ecuador, Art. 177, Peru,
Art. 32, and Venezuela, Art. 108.
'0 Art. 18.




3rd. With regard to the obligation of respecting the soclo-eco-
nomic system of the Republic.
4th. With regard to the obligation of observing the Constitution
and the Law
5th. With regard to the obligation of contributing to the public
expenses in the form and to the amount provided by law
6th. With regard to submission to the jurisdiction and decisions
of the tribunals of justice and the authorities of the Republic.
7th. With regard to the enjoyment of civil rights, under the con-
ditions and within the limitations prescribed by law "12
No one can fail to see that the purpose of these constitutional pro-
visions is to compel aliens to use internal courts before they resort to
diplomatic channels."3 This point should be clear thus far. However,
many publicists as well as several Governments, have attacked the Calvo
Clause on various grounds. Thus, Professor Brierly contends that the
Calvo Clause attempts to exclude altogether the responsibility of States
towards aliens.' 4 A more substantial argument has been advanced and
maintained by the United States Department of State, rejecting the
Calvo Clause on the ground that an unaccredited agent may not re-
nounce the right or privilege of the government in protecting its citizens
abroad.' 5 The British Government, on the other hand, has felt that the
Calvo Clause cannot be applied to tortious acts of revolutionary forces
or to wilful destruction of aliens' property, and that in claims arising
out of these torts, the governments have the right of espousing the
claims of their nationals. 6 It is not altogether clear whether the British
Government accepts the Calvo Clause in claims arising out of contract-
ual obligations. However, from the opinion rendered by the British
Commissioners who have participated in cases involving the Calvo
Clause, it is fair to attribute to the British Government approval of the
clause in contract cases..7
One can of course readily appreciate that the validity of the Calvo
Clause has been sharply debated from the standpoint of International
2 Art. 19. Also the Constitutions of El Salvador, Art. 45 and Costa Rica, Art. 12.
It should be mentioned that at the time of the writing of this article the
Constitution of Costa Rica was undergoing a complete revision by a con-
stitutional convention.
13 As a summary, the following Latin American countries have provisions for a
Calvo Clause: Bolivia, Art. 18, Ecuador, Art. 177, Honduras, Art. 19; Mexico,
Art. 27, Nicaragua, Art. 25, Peru, Art. 32; and Venezuela, Art. 108. The
following countries have provisions for the Calvo Doctrine only" Costa Rica,
Art. 12, Cuba, Art. 19 and El Salvador, Arts. 45 and 47
'4 J. L. Brierly, Op.Cit. p. 181.
15 Memorandum of Mr. Root, Secretary of State, to the President, March 27,
1908, G. H. Hackworth, Digest, p. 636.16 Dissenting opinion of the British Commissioner in the British-Mexican Claims




Law Inasmuch as some Latin American States still use the Calvo
Clause in contracts with aliens, it would be profitable to proceed to a
discussion of the Clause in the light of the Law of Nations, resorting
as much as possible to the decisions of arbitration courts on the subject.
II. Local Remedies, Dental of Justice and the Calvo Clause.
Traditional International Law has accepted the doctrine that matters
of immigration, naturalization and nationality fall completely within the
jurisdiction of the States.18 However, in matters of expulsion, which
involves more drastic consequences for aliens, judicial theory has been
inclined to condition the right of States to expel aliens on the fulfill-
ment of certain requirements. 19 Aside from this extreme measure to
which a State may resort, it is safe to say that since the States have an
unfettered control of immigration and emigration, it will necessarily
follow that they also have the right to impose conditions before the
admission of aliens is granted.2 0 One of these conditions may be the
obligation to resort to local remedies as regards reparations for damage
sustained by a foreigner.21 The rule of local remedies, however, is
extremely difficult to square with the desire of some States to obtain
a better treatment for citizens. This desire is motivated by a lack of
confidence on the part of the States which think of themselves as having
a superior standard of civilized justice. But for any State to allow
foreign States to interfere on behalf of their citizens would amount to
giving aliens a degree of consideration which its own nationals obvi-
ously do not receive. If an alien desires to go to a foreign country
where the administration of justice is not based on the same principles
and postulates as his own, he is presumed to know all these facts and
it may be convincingly argued that he is just taking an ordinary risk.m
This assumption would even be more tenable in the case of aliens who
go to countries that expressly provide m their constitutions that aliens
residing in their territory are equal to nationals "with regard to the
Is Chinese Exclusion Case: Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889). For more recent decisions see, Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F (2d)
239 (C.C.A. 9th, 1948), United States ex rel. Lapidest v. Watkins, 165 F (2d)
1017 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948), and United States ex rel. Tinler v. Carus, 166 F (2d)
457 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1948).
29 Boffolo Case, Italy-Venezuela Arbitration Before the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed
Claims Commission, 1903. H. W. Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 492-496.
20 Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), 149 U.S. 698, Colyer v. Skeffington,
(1920) 265 Fed. 17
21 Edwin M. Borchard, Op.Cit. pp. 817-818. However, Professor Borchard here
adds the corollary that the remedies for a violation of his rights must exist
in the local courts. This is only natural, since "an alien cannot resort to local
remedies when there are none to be had."
2 United States (Rosa Gelbtrunk Claim) v. Salvador, United States-Salvador
Claims Arbitration, 1902. H. W. Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 503-507 at p. 504.
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protection of their persons and their goods." 23 Therefore, from the
standpoint of his own country, an alien cannot plead ignorance of these
constitutional provisions that compel him to resort to local remedies.
It is clear, however, that only in the event that local remedies are ex-
hausted without obtaining justice, may diplomatic protection be al-
lowed.24 On the other hand, it appears that the exhaustion of local
remedies has been subject to arbitrary interpretation in every specific
case.2 5 It seems to be a question of fact whether local remedies have
been exhausted. The fact that an alien has not obtained a favorable
judgment does not necessarily mean that local remedies have been ex-
hausted and that therefore, a denial of justice has been established.2 6
Denial of justice is a very restricted doctrine which depends upon cer-
tain considerations of fact. As long as the State of residence furnishes
all aliens with all means of protecting their rights by an adequate judi-
cial procedure on the same grounds as nationals, denial of justice can-
not be invoked. Furthermore, equality of treatment does not mean
that the alien has to be regulated by his own national law, or that in
determining his guilt or innocence, the State of residence has to resort
to the institutions and practices of the State of which the alien is a
national.28 Nor does it mean that an alien has the right to invoke diplo-
matic protection from his own government. As has been expressed by
an Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs "equal treatment means equal
protection from the law, not special diplomatic protection. '29 A differ-
ent approach was suggested in the Neer case decided by a General
Claims Commission established by the United States and Mexico, where
the Commissioners were of opinion that even though denial of justice
could not be established, nevertheless better methods in prosecuting the
criminals could have been used.3 0 It should be observed that when an
arbitration court determines that "better methods could have been used
23 Constitution of Cuba, Art. 19.
24 Harvard Research on the Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, p. 149.
2 G. H. Hackworth, Digest, pp. 501-526.
26 In order to avoid this arbitrary interpretation of denial of justice, the Consti-
tution of Honduras has established in Article 19 that "aliens may not have
recourse to diplomatic channels except in cases of denial of justice. For this
purpose, denial of justice is not understood to mean an executed verdict that
is unfavorable to the claimant." The same stipulation is found in the Con-
stitution of Nicaragua, Art. 25.
27 Edwin M. Borchard, Op.Cit. pp. 27-39.
28 In this connection, see the note from the United States Department of State
to the American Legation in Panama, G. H. Hackworth, Digest, pp. 541-542.
29 Note of the Argentine Foreign Minister to the British Legation in Buenos
Aires, quoted by Daniel Antokoletz, Tratado de Derecho Internactonal Pilblico,
Tercera Edicion, (Buenos Aires, 1938), Vol. II, pp. 608-609.
30 H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 505-507
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in the prosecution of a criminal", the court. is setting up a somewhat
indefinite standard, which depends entirely upon the subjective appre-
ciation of the court itself. Moreover, it is relevant to remark that from
the standpoint of traditional International Law, a State does not have
the obligation to furnish aliens with more protection and more advan-
tages than it supplies to its own nationals, even if the protection given
by the State of residence falls below the protection accorded by the
State of which the alien is a citizen.31 As Professor Borchard has aptly
said. "the resident alien does not derive his rights directly from Inter-
national Law, but from the municipal law of the State of residence."' '
It will logically follow that if in a primative State only primitive meth-
ods are available both to aliens and nationals, the responsibility of the
State is not involved, since it has given to aliens the same protection
and the same means of redress which it is capable of giving under the
circumstances. Thus, in the George J Salem case,33 (United States v
Egypt), the arbitration commission declared.
"As a rule, a foreigner must acknowledge as applicable to him-
self the kind of justice instituted in the country in which he did
choose his residence including all deficiencies of such jurisdic-
tion, imperfect as it is like any other human work."
The same principle was applied in the Gelbtrunk case,34 where it
was held that
" The State to which he (the alien) owes national allegiance
has no right to claim for him as against the nation in which he is
resident any other or different treatment in case of loss by war
-either foreign or civil-revolution, insurrection or other in-
ternal disturbance caused by organized military force or by
soldiers, than that which the latter country metes out to its own
subjects or citizens."
Of course, if there were an objective international standard of justice,
the alien's national State would have grounds for demanding more than
equality of treatment for its own nationals in the event that the local
standards fell below such an international standard of justice. How-
ever, is seems that judicial authority35 as well as the writings of the
3 Article 5 of the Harvard Draft Convention on the Responsibility of States
says. "A State has a duty to afford to an alien means of redress for injuries
which are not less adequate than the means of redress afforded to its
nationals."
32 Edwin M. Borchard, Op.Cit. p. 27
33 G. H. Hackworth, Digest, p. 543.
34 C. G. Fenwick, Cases on International Law (Hereinafter Cases) (Chicago
Callahan and Co., 1935), pp. 226-228.
35 Gelbtrunk Claim case, supra, n. 34.
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best qualified experts on the subject, 6 expressly admit that there is
no "international standard of justice" and that the only duty a State
has with regard to aliens, is to give them the same protection which it
gives to its own citizens.
So much for the doctrines of local remedies and denial of justice.
The question still remains as to whether the Calvo Clause is within the
conceptions thus far discussed. There has been the repeated assertion
today that the Calvo Clause is nothing more than a promise to use local
remedies and therefore, it is unnecessary as well as harmless.3 7 This
contention obviously fails to take into account the full implications of
a Calvo Clause. Assuming that there is a Calvo Clause with regard to
waiving diplomatic protection except in cases of denial of justice, this
provision is much more fundamental than appears at first sight. Some
interpretations have expanded the meaning of the Calvo Clause even
in the determination of what might be termed substantive rights. The
Calvo Clause in these cases not only waives diplomatic protection in
matters arising under the contract, but it goes a step further in provid-
ing that such questions as denials of justice will be determined by the
laws of the forum.3 8 In other words, the Calvo Clause aims at exclud-
ing completely the diplomatic interposition of any other nation, for
even the determination of whether or not this interposition is warranted
is finally decided by the local law It is therefore clear, that the Calvo
Clause is more than a promise to use local remedies, and perhaps is
more ambitious than the original Clause developed under the Calvo
Doctrine. Moreover, the Calvo Clause today has teeth in it provisions,
for most of the constitutions that incorporate a Calvo Clause provide
that the violation of it will terminate the rights that the aliens have
36 Clyde Eagleton, Op.Cit. p. 83. See also Judge Guerrero's Report on the Respon-
sibility of States for Damages Done in Their Territories to the Person or
Property of Foreigners, submitted to the Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law. Cited by H. W Briggs, Op.Cit.
p. 508.
37 P C. Jessup, Op.Cit. p. 111.
38 For example, a law of El Salvador issued in September 29, 1886 stated that a
denial of justice occurred only when a court refused to render a decision in
a litigation submitted to it. Cited by Daniel Antokoletz, Op.Cit. Vol. II, p. 609.
Also the Civil Code of the Republic of Panama provides in article 2 that "a
court that refuses to decide a case on grounds of obscurity or insufficiency
of the law, will incur responsibility." This responsibility may be denial of
justice. It seems, therefore, that in these two countries refusal to decide a
a case is the only ground for claiming denial of justice. Compare the inter-
pretation of denial of justice maintained by the Government of the United
States, G. H. Hackworth, Digest, pp. 526-555.
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acquired under the contract. 39 This meansthat the Calvo Clause is no
longer an expression of wishful thinking, but has become a highly com-
plicated institution with its own enforcing machinery
Along the same lines, to say that the Latin American states have
insisted on the application of the Calvo Clause in order to escape their
international responsibility," is to pass superficial judgment without
going into the actual significance and implication of the problem in-
volved. Furthermore, to say that the Calvo Clause is not useful any-
more since the same result may be accomplished by the rule of local
remedies, 41 is to ignore completely that what the Latin American
countries with to avoid is the constant interference in their administra-
tion of justice on purely discretionary grounds. The rule of local reme-
dies is not powerful enough to prevent this interference, as has been
proved in the past.- That explains why the Latin American States
have resorted to a contract, which from the standpoint of legal theory
has more validity than the doctrine of local remedies since the latter
has no enforcing machinery but is merely a vague promise, without any
binding obligation, of using local courts in the event of disputes arising
under a contract. The experience in the application of the local reme-
dies doctrine will warrant the contention that in many cases govern-
ments have questioned the existence of local remedies and have ac-
cordingly invoked denial of justice. In this way, a litigation has ensued
which, although it could have been adequately handled by the local
courts, saving the litigants time and money, has usually taken an in-
ordinately long time to resolve since it had to be decided by an arbi-
tration court. By the Calvo Clause's insistence on the use of local
remedies, it has become a sanction of International Law, for the alien
cannot resort to his government in violation of his contractual obliga-
tions unless a clear denial of justice is established. Contrary to what
Professor Jessup suggests, it should be the rule that if the international
tribunal finds that the aliens did not resort to local remedies, disregard-
39 On this, the Mexican Constitution provides that "should the aliens fail to re-
spect the agreement (Calvo Clause), they shall be penalized by losing to the
benefit of the Nation the properties they may have acquired," Art. 27, para-
graph 1st. The Honduran Constitution provides that the violation of the
Calvo Clause will result in losing the claims to the country, and the "claimant
shall forfeit his rights to live in the country", Art. 19; also the Constitution
of Nicaragua provides that violation will terminate the right of the alien to
live in the country, Art. 25.
40J. L. Brierly, Op.Cit. p. 181.
41 p C. Jessup, Op.Cit. p. 111.
42 H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 509-522.
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ing the operation of the Calvo Clause which they freely signed, the
costs of litigation should be collectible as part of the judgment against
the claimant.4 3
III. The North American Dredging Co. case revisited.
Our discussion of the Calvo Clause would not be complete without
discussion of the North American Dredging Co. case,4 4 which was de-
cided by the General Claims Commission set up under the Convention
concluded between the United States and Mexico in 1923. The case
put before the Commission by the Government of the United States on
behalf of the North American Dredging Company of Texas for the
recovery of the sum of $233,523.30 with interest. This amount repre-
sented losses and damages allegedly suffered by the Company for
breaches of a contract for dredging at a Mexican port. The contract
was signed between the Company and the Mexican Government, in
Mexico City, and it contained a Calvo Clause providing that the con-
tractor and all persons would be considered as Mexicans in all matters,
within the Republic of Mexico, concerning the execution of the work
as well as the fulfillment of the contract. Moreover, the Company
agreed not to invoke the diplomatic protection of foreign diplomatic
agents in any matter related to the contract.45 The decision of the case
naturally revolved around the validity of the Calvo Clause.
The position of the United States regarding the validity of the Calvo
Clause emphasized primarily that a private citizen cannot give up the
rights of his government. 46 According to the State Department, the
Calvo Clause purports to destroy the right of the government, since
the alien agrees not to invoke its diplomatic protection. In this respect,
it should be emphasized that the North American Dredging Company
without pressure of any sort, except the one that may have been derived
from the desire to obtain the concession, agreed to sign the Calvo
43 P C. Jessup, Op.Cit. p. 11.
44 C. G. Fenwick, Cases, pp. 236-243, also H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 524-533.
45 The exact provision of the contract was "The contractor and all persons who,
as employees or in any other capacity, may be engaged in the execution of
the work under this contract either directly or indirectly, shall be considered
as Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic of Mexico, concerning the
execution of such work and the fulfillment of this contract. They shall not
claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and the business
connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same
than those granted by the laws of the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall they
enjoy any other rights than those established in favor of Mexicans. They
are consequently deprived of any rights as aliens, and under no conditions
shall the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents be permitted, in any matter
related to this contract." Quoted by G. H. Hackworth, Digest, p. 641.
46 Memorandum submitted by Mr. Root, Secretary of State, to the President,
G. H. Hackworth, Digest, p. 636.
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Clause, with full knowledge of its legal implications and consequences.4 7
Furthermore, the Calvo Clause embodied in the contract did not deny
entirely the right of diplomatic protection but, following the usual meth-
od, sought to compel the Company to resort to Mexican laws and Mex-
ican courts. It also appears from the records that the Company signed
the contract with no intention of fulfilling its provisions.4 The Com-
mission decided that this case did not fall within its jurisdiction.
Obviously, the Commission decided the case in the light of existing
International Law 4' It is fully recognized by the decision that Inter-
national Law grants the States the right to protect their citizens when
subject to discrimination or undue treatment abroad. But it must be
remembered that the Calvo Clause does not limit this right. It merely
imposes on aliens certain conditions perfectly legal under International
Law 50 Calvo himself did not exclude diplomatic protection in all cases.
but admitted that there were some instances where interposition rested
on incontestable rights. 51 Moreover, if the jurisdiction of the alien's
government is temporarily suspended by the operation of the Calvo
Clause, the alien is not left without any substitute, but can always
resort to local remedies until adequate redress is obtained.52 On
the other hand, the analogy is advanced that the Calvo Clause would
be comparable to a case "under the law of the United States in which
the contracting parties seek to oust the jurisdiction of the courts."53
This analogy seems to ignore the fact that private individuals may vol-
untarily exclude the jurisdiction of national courts by an agreement
to settle a dispute out of court, and that even in the prosecution of tort
cases the court will not act unless it is requested to do so by private
initiative. Similarly, the right of protection of citizens abroad de-
pends upon the right of the individual, and if the latter chooses to re-
nounce such protection by signing a contract to that effect, the State
concerned should not have anything else to say, since according to
Professor Jessup "the rights which appertain to the individual may be
waived by the individual. '54
The opposite contention may be advanced that in all traditional text-
books on International Law it is stated that individuals do not derive
47 C. G. Fenwick, Cases, at p. 239.
48 Ibid. at p. 242.
49 Contra, dissenting opinion of Umpire Nielsen in the International Fisheries
Claim case; quoted by H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. pp. 533-541.
50 On these conditions and their validity, see Oppenheim, Op.Cit. Vol. I, p. 112.
51 Cited by Samuel F Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), p. 230.
52 This argument answers Professor Jessup's objection, Op.Cit. pp. 111-112.
53 Ibid. p. 112.54 Ibid. p. 111.
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their rights directly, but rather indirectly, from International Law
which operates through the medium of the State. From a present-day
standpoint, it cannot be questioned that individuals are subjects of in-
ternational rights given to them directly by International Law We
must be logical and finally admit that behind the State are the individ-
uals who are directly affected by whatever practice the States choose
to consider as binding. Moreover, one needs no special effort to see
that there have been a great many treaties of a humanitarian character
which incorporate individual rights in the positive Law of Nations and
that these rights are made effective through international institutions. 55
In another connection, it would be a very sad affair indeed if it were
claimed that individuals have obligations under the Law of Nations, as
the Nuremburg Trials proved,56 but that on the other hand, it is denied
that individuals have rights under International Law It certainly
makes no sense to say that under the Law of Nations individuals have
duties, but no rights. Such legal theory would not be an imperative
but a preferential postulate. Continued adherence to it under changing
conditions, will produce more chaos than order in the international
community
The conclusion is thus inescapable that a consistent approach to the
problem of International Law will have to give rights to individuals
in the same way as it has demanded obligations and responsibilities
from them. When the Calvo Clause is considered in this light, the
fundamental objection of the United States that the Clause is invalid
because individuals do not have rights under International Law loses
all its value.57
In commenting on the Dredging Company Case, Umpire Nielsen
said.
"Domestic laws cannot destroy rights secured by International
Law Since one nation's rights cannot be extinguished by local
laws of another nation, then if such rights can be destroyed by
contracts made by a nation with a private individual, the capacity
for such an accomplishment must be attributed, not to some
authority possessed by the contracting nation, but to the potency
of the individual, or to some alchemistic legal product resulting
from a combination of both." 58
55 For instance, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, Oppen-
heim, Op.Cit., Vol. I, pp. 584-585.
56Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial against the Major War Criminals and
International Law, Am. Jour of International Law, (1949), Vol. 43, p. 223,
at pp. 233-235.
57 P C. Jessup, Op.Cit. p. 111.
58 Quoted by H. W Briggs, Op.Cit. p. 535.
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With deference for the authority of Umpire Neilsen, it is suggested
that the rights of the United States Government were not destroyed by
a domestic enactment of Mexico, but by the free will of the Company
which entered into the contract. In this connection, Mr. Nielson lost
sight of the fact that it was the act of the Company that desroyed the
right of the Government of the United States, and not the Mexican
provision. The whole question, therefore, had to revolve around the
rights of the Company to waive the protection of its government under
International Law It should be observed that Mr. Nielsen wrote hIs
dissenting opinion in 1931 with regard to the International Fisherws
Company case, when it was universally accepted that International Law
applied only to States, not to individuals. From the preceding para-
graph, it may be concluded that such an argument could not be suc-
cessfully maintained today when the tendency is to give rights and
obligations to individuals and corporations directly under International
Law 5 If this proposition is accepted, Mr. Nielsen's objection against
the decision in the Dredging Company case loses all logical basis.
Even if the case is considered strictly from the standpoint of tra-
ditional International Law, it appears from the facts that the Company
did not even attempt to exhaust local remedies before invoking the pro-
tection of the Government.6" Therefore, the Company could not pos-
sibly establish denial of justice, and the Government of the United
States could not legally espouse this claim until local remedies were
exhausted. As the Commission pointed out, the Company could legally
have resorted to the United States Government for protection only if
resort to Mexican tribunals or other authorities available to it "resulted
in a denial or delay of justice In such a case the claimant's com-
plaint would be not that his contract was violated but that he had been
denied justice.""1
It should be added that the Calvo Clause in this case, as in any other
case, did not aim at escaping international responsibility for breaches
of contract on the part of Latin American Governments. It would be
more accurate to say, from the standpoint of the original purpose of
the Clause, that it aims at preventing the diplomatic protection of aliens
from "being an instrument of oppression used by strong States against
weak ones," 6 and in so far as this end is accomplished, the Calvo
Clause enforces specifice postulates of the Law of Nations.
59 C. G. Fenwick, International Law, pp. 131-133.
60 C. G. Fenwick, Cases, p. 242.
61 Ibid. p. 241.
62 The Mexican Jurist Garcia-Robles submitted this project to the Inter-American
Bar Association at Havana in 1944. See on this, C. G. Fenwick, International
Law, p. 293, n. 71.
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Analyzing the contentions of both Governments in the light of the
decision rendered, the Dredging Company case represents an attempt
at reconciling two opposite claims of apparently equal weight. With-
out openly admitting or denying the validity of the Clause, the Com-
mission said
"Under the rules of International Law may an alien lawfully
make such a promise? (That is, not to invoke diplomatic protec-
tion) The Commission holds that he may, but at the same time
holds that he cannot deprive the government of his nation of
its undoubted right of applying international remedies to his
damage But while any attempt to so bind his government is
void, the Commission has not found any generally recognized
rule of positive International Law which would give to his gov-
ernment the right to intervene to strike down a lawful con-
tract. "63
Umpire Nielsen finally contended that in the Brief of the United
States Government there were allegations with respect to arbitrary
interference of the Mexican Government in the work of the Company,
that there was no payment for work performed and that there was even
seizure of property He further stated that these charges were not
denied by the Mexican Government. 64 But again, even from the stand-
point of the same International Law which Umpire Nielsen sought to
preserve, resort to diplomatic protection was not available to the Com-
pany until local remedies were exhausted, especially when it was
established beyond doubt that local remedies were open all the time
and there was a solemn word on the part of the Company to use them
in the event of any dispute arising under the contract.
IV Conclusion.
Whether or not the Calvo Clause is legal is extremely difficult to
say in the presence of so many conflicting opinions. Later in the deci-
sion of the International Fishertes Company case,65 also between the
United States and Mexico, decided in 1931, the Commission said that
"it did not find any ground for modifying or revoking the doctrine
established by this Commission in the matter of the North American
Dredging Company of Texas."6 The same opinion was held by a
British-Mexican Commission in the Mexican Umon Railway case. 7
But even though the validity of the Clause has been upheld in many
cases, it is equally true that the Calvo Clause has been rejected in many
63 C. G. Fenwick, Cases, p. 239.
64 H. W. Briggs, Op.Cit. p. 541.
65 G. W Hackworth, Digest, pp. 643-647
-Ibid. p. 645.
67 Ibid. pp. 647-650.
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other instances.68 It is my personal opinion that a true understanding
of the Calvo Clause will lead to the conclusion that, if adhered to by
all States, it performs the function of enforcing International Law by
compelling individuals to accept and use local remedies . The Calvo
Clause stands for non-intervention, which is a universally recognized
postulate of the Law of Nations. Hence, this article should have proved
that there is nothing incompatible between the Calvo Clause and Inter-
national Law
The controversy over the Calvo Clause still continues, as manifested
in the writings of several publicists.69 The Latin American States have
made several moves to incorporate the Clause into a Pan-American
Convention.7" Thus, the Convention on the Rights of Aliens, which was
adopted in 1902 in Mexico City at the Second Pan-American Confer-
ence, had a provision to the effect that whenever an alien has a claim
against a State or its citizens, he shall present it to the competent au-
thorities of the country without resorting to diplomatic protection
except where there is a manifest denial of justice.71 This Convention
was never ratified by the United States, but the consensus of opinion
today seems to be that, even though the United States and the Euro-
pean countries have opposed the Calvo Clause in principle, neverthe-
less they conform to it as a matter of practice except in cases of a clear
denial of justice.7 2
68 Professor Briggs has pointed out that of twenty seven cases involving the
Calvo Clause, eleven have denied the validity of the Clause and sixteen have
upheld it. Op.Cit. p. 541.
69 C. G. Fenwick, International Law, p. 293, n. 71.
70 See on this, The Codification of International Law in the Americas, Law and
Treaty Series, No. 20, Juridical Division, Pan-American Union, October, 1946,
p. 25.
71 M. M. McMahon, Op.Cit. p. 194.
72 Ibid. pp. 195-196.
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